کتاب طراحی بازار برای جفت‌سازی کارجویان و کارفرمایان با فرمت AZW3 برای کتابخوان کیندل و فرمت EPUB

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🎓 دوره آموزشی جامع

📚 اطلاعات دوره

عنوان دوره: دوره طراحی بازار برای جفت‌سازی کارجویان و کارفرمایان

موضوع کلی: نظریه بازی‌ها و طراحی بازار

موضوع میانی: طراحی بازار برای تخصیص محصولات عمومی

📋 سرفصل‌های دوره

  • 1. Core Principles of Market Design for Labor Matching
  • 2. Agent Preferences: Modeling Job Seeker Priorities
  • 3. Employer Preference Specification and Ranking
  • 4. Compatibility and Preference Elicitation Methods
  • 5. Stability Concepts in Job-Matching Markets
  • 6. Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Labor Allocation
  • 7. The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm Applied to Recruitment
  • 8. Handling Ties and Incomplete Rankings in Hiring
  • 9. Efficiency-Stability Trade-offs in Market Design
  • 10. Fairness Criteria and Equity in Applicant Allocation
  • 11. Priority Rules and Protected-Veteran Preferences
  • 12. Designing Mechanisms for Multi-Employer Matching
  • 13. Two-Sided Matching with Couples and Dual Preferences
  • 14. Mechanism Design for Internship and Co-op Placements
  • 15. Incentive Compatibility and Truthful Reporting
  • 16. Information Asymmetry and Disclosure Requirements
  • 17. Mechanism Implementation: Software Platforms and Tools
  • 18. Computational Methods for Large-Scale Matching
  • 19. Stability and Strategy-Proofness: Practical Limits
  • 20. Mechanism Robustness Against Manipulation
  • 21. Designing Markets for Gig Economy Worker Allocation
  • 22. Multi-Sided Matching: Platforms, Employers, Freelancers
  • 23. Preference Learning Using Historical Matching Data
  • 24. Experimental Evaluation of Matching Mechanisms
  • 25. Sensitivity Analysis of Priority and Weight Parameters
  • 26. Designing Mechanisms with Transferable Utility
  • 27. Non-Transferable Utility Matching in Labor Markets
  • 28. Post-Matching Adjustments and Re-Matching Procedures
  • 29. Welfare Measurement and Gains from Trade Analysis
  • 30. Policy Integration and Regulatory Framework Design
  • 31. Ethical Considerations in Algorithm-Driven Hiring
  • 32. Bias Detection and Mitigation in Matching Mechanisms
  • 33. Inclusion and Diversity Design Principles
  • 34. Historical Case Studies: Hospital-Resident Adaptations
  • 35. Case Study: University Graduates Labor Placement
  • 36. Mechanism Design for Seasonal and Project-Based Hiring
  • 37. Dynamic Matching Markets with Time-Varying Preferences
  • 38. Repeated Matching and Reputation Building
  • 39. Mechanism Design for International Talent Allocation
  • 40. Cross-Border Qualification and Credential Matching
  • 41. Core Concepts: Matching Markets vs. Traditional Recruitment
  • 42. Assignment Problem Foundations for Single-Sided Markets
  • 43. Mechanism Evaluation Metrics: Stability, Efficiency, Fairness
  • 44. Parameter Tuning for Specific Labor Market Segments
  • 45. Mechanism Design for Apprenticeship Program Allocation
  • 46. Managing Unmatched Applicants and Vacancy Filling
  • 47. Waitlist Strategies and Off-Cycle Matching
  • 48. Mechanism Transparency and Applicant Experience
  • 49. Designing Incentives for Employer Participation
  • 50. Incentive Structures for Applicant Engagement
  • 51. Mechanism Feedback Loops and Continuous Improvement
  • 52. Integration of AI and Predictive Modeling in Preferences
  • 53. Preference Elicitation Through Choice Experiments
  • 54. Robust Mechanism Design Under Uncertainty
  • 55. Scenario Analysis and Stress Testing of Matching Systems
  • 56. Designing Markets for Non-Profit and Volunteer Allocation
  • 57. Comparative Analysis of Global Matching Mechanisms
  • 58. Emerging Frontiers: Blockchain and Decentralized Matching
تگ‌ها: algorithmic-hiring deferred-acceptance employer-candidate fairness-equity incentive-compatibility job-matching labor-market market-design matching-theory mechanism-design mechanism-evaluation preference-elicitation stability-analysis

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